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Popularizing, Moralizing, and the Soul of American Science 
 
The formidable amount of work contained within the pages of John Burnham’s How 
Superstition Won and Science Lost: Popularizing Science and Health in the United States remains as 
daunting today as when it was first published in 1987-- evidenced not least by the fact that it 
contains 91 pages of endnotes in eight-point type. The text likewise bursts beyond the 
bounds of the standard-issue format of academic monographs in the history of science, 
whether then or now. In a conventional treatment, an author examines one scientific 
discipline (or, perhaps more accurately, one sub-discipline); restricts the temporal scope to 
no more than a generation or two (although less would not be unusual); focuses on a well-
defined research cohort and those with whom its members are allied or at odds (with works 
centered on a single individual also common); and a scope that is kept contained within the 
laboratory (or the pages of specialist journals). Burnham obliterates these norms in How 
Superstition Won and Science Lost, a work that encompasses three separate areas of specialist 
expertise -- the natural sciences, health sciences, and psychology; sweeps across the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries and also expounds at some length about the scientific 
revolution of the early modern era; incorporates a heavily-populated roster of individuals 
too large to recall after a first reading; and aims at nothing less than producing the definitive 





I first encountered How Superstition Won and Science Lost when I was about half-way through 
my doctoral training at UC San Diego (where I would earn the first Ph.D. in 
History/Science Studies granted by the newly-minted interdisciplinary graduate program 
there in 1993). On the one hand, to read it through was a reassuring experience: it was a 
book that took seriously the history of American science with the public in view; it 
entertained questions about the circulation of scientific knowledge across different domains; 
it directly addressed the nature of scientific authority; and it gave extensive consideration to 
popularization – areas in which I was intensely interested, and for which little relevant 
literature existed. Burnham’s text sprawled across an unusually wide ambit of topics to be 
contained within a single volume: the professionalization of science, newspapers, the 
warfare thesis and American religion, elementary education, the nature study movement, 
editorial ventures such as Science Service, advertising, amateurs, skepticism, high school 
science, hygiene instruction, the environmental movement, museums, magazines, books, 
radio, television, and more. In doing so, this work counteracted the hyper-specialization 
that makes it difficult to pursue wider-angle views that take in the cultural history of science, 
and not just the history of scientists. Alongside issue #1 on “Historical Writing on 
American Science” in the recently resurrected journal Osiris in 1985, I found How 
Superstition Won and Science Lost to be a welcome sourcebook and hypothesis-generator 
about the relationships between the American scientific community and the nation’s 
citizens.2 
  




the book was about these topics. The surfeit of items had not been gathered together to 
establish a thickly descriptive examination about science and its publics, but instead to serve 
as cross-corroborating evidence to be referenced for Burnham’s main argument: that 
twentieth-century scientists had turned their backs on what he characterized as the moral 
commitment of their nineteenth-century predecessors to use popularization to speak directly 
to the general public and to destroy false claims and error. These later cohorts of reprobates, 
in Burnham’s telling, had allowed media outlets to promulgate degraded forms of 
popularization that trafficked in sensationalism and other forms of distortion in the pursuit 
of commercial profit. Burnham’s historical account largely reserved agency for the scientific 
community, (hapless) educators, and media personnel; his “American public” was relatively 
passive and undifferentiated, serving more as a backdrop to the actions of others than forces 
in their own right. That the public, once again, had been relegated to the sidelines of history 
of science was unsurprising to me at the time – a default stance in history of science 
scholarship that has proven stubbornly resistant to change – but it was nonetheless a 
disappointment. The lesson I took from this authorial choice was not that American culture 
had come up short, but that history of science had. If I was going to be able to make 
headway in re-conceptualizing what I would come to call “science in the American 
vernacular,” it seemed that the way forward was not by means of the kind of preoccupations 
about elite authority that exercised Burnham, but instead in bringing interdisciplinary 
perspectives to bear that dismantled the validity of the deficit model of the public mind and 
of the one-way flow of scientific information – as did work in cultural studies, the sociology 





In re-visiting How Superstition Won and Science Lost for a second look, the vexation I felt years 
ago for the ground it broke and the ground it refused to yield remained. This time, however, 
I was struck more forcefully by Burnham’s treatment of his scientific figures and his media 
targets than by the submergence of the public. In the nineteenth-century men of science 
portion of the book, amidst the collection of observations by individuals in and outside of 
science that Burnham assembled to speak for the times, a recurring figure stood out, one 
who perhaps could be assigned the status of heroic exemplar: E.L. Youmans. Youmans, 
who founded Popular Science Monthly in 1872 and served as its first editor, was a relentless 
promoter of science as the apotheosis of modern life, a fierce defender of scientific 
naturalism in the face of opposition, and a thought leader who served as “Interpreter of 
Science for the People” (the subtitle of John Fiske’s 1894 biography).4 Youmans finds favor 
with Burnham for his hybrid status: by combining his wealth of scientific knowledge with 
his skill in communicating with the public, he is the man of science as popularizer par 
excellence. There is even more to this approbation: Youmans is clear that men of science are 
allied with and inhabit the sphere of “cultivated people” who are “the intelligent and 
influential [members of the] American public,” and he steadfastly believed that science 
should be identified “with both high culture and social improvement of all kinds.”5 
 
Recognizing Youmans’ importance to Burnham in the first half of his book as a fervent 
believer in the religion of science who relentlessly sought converts amongst America’s finest 
helps to clarify the vehemence with which he denounces those who in the second half of the 




media status – but who conduct their lives in ways that are inverse to his example. Burnham 
argues that by the 1970s “science was in retreat” courtesy of, in part, “the chic intellectuals 
[who] turned their skepticism against the late-nineteenth century ideal of science, not 
against superstition, mysticism, and commercial exploitation” and those others who 
expressed a “hunger for wonders” and waged “angry warfare against a whole style of life in 
which rationalism and science were inextricably associated with the upper part of the social 
hierarchy and with civilized behaviour.” As one example of how professional scientists were 
complicit in undermining truth, Burnham contends that psychologists, “instead of 
regrouping for the grand battle” against the nonempirical and the irrational, instead “joined 
the enemy or at least collaborated in the name of eclecticism . . . Even the editors of 
Psychology Today were publishing papers debunking science and objectivity.”6 
 
In re-encountering Burnham’s assessments, I was intrigued by how closely the text fits 
within the rhetorical genre of the American jeremiad – a conclusion also reached in Nancy 
Tomes’s insightful discussion in this Focus section, which states it directly in its title: “An 
American Jeremiad: John C. Burnham and the History of Science Popularization.”7 In 
encountering the air of fire and brimstone in this second look, I found it hard to escape the 
feeling that Burnham’s militant excoriation was directed not only at professional scientists 
but also at historians of science who were experimenting with the kind of interdisciplinary 
“science studies” that was emerging in the late 1980s. The historiographic breadcrumb trail 
that Tomes points to in her essay is instructive in this regard.  
 




contemporary sin and covenant-breaking contained in the biblical Book of Jeremiah, and 
specifically references the body of literature that emerged from sermons preached by the 
second generation of New England Puritans, in which contemporary congregations were 
called to account for and repent from the depravity of their declension from the purity and 
holiness of the founding generation. In a startlingly- like manner, How Superstition Won and 
Science Lost recounts the virtuous past forged by the nineteenth-century’s men of science, 
individuals who viewed scientific life as a “calling” and who promoted “the religion of 
science . . . with evangelical fervor” in order to bring “enlightenment by exposing everyone 
to the truth, that is, by popularizing science.” Burnham situates the betrayal of the founding 
generation as emerging in the 1890s with the increasing power of what he repeatedly 
characterizes as the “yellow press,” and which he contends initiated changes that “signalled 
the beginning of the end.”8 
 
As the twentieth century proceeded, Burnham contends, “the retreat of the research elite 
from the arena of popularizing” destroyed the scientists’ covenant with the public, a 
violation that would be compounded by scientists turning a blind eye to the reality that “the 
influence of journalists” who had replaced them as popularizers “was altogether corrupting, 
turning high culture into trivial news items.” The declension extends on into the post-World 
War II era, when, as one example, “the increasing presence of television after the 1950s 
oppressed and counteracted all serious attempts to popularize science” and therefore 
contributed to the retrogression of science in the next decades. Burnham argues that after 
World War II, there were few scientists worthy of the name to be found, as more and more 




a calling, these individuals displayed “a failure of nerve,” and in consequence “few 
practitioners stood up to speak for science or the religion of science.” And, as he asserts in 
his closing, “science probably did not exist any longer on the popular level.”9 The 
destruction of the temple of science had left the American people to wander through its 
ruins with no way to revive its true spirit. 
 
What is striking about this foreclosure of redemption is that this is not how American 
jeremiads are designed to conclude: the invocation of condemnation and lamentation are 
intended to empower the congregants to go forth and repair the breach and reclaim the 
original promise. In reflecting on the general framework of How Superstition Won and Science 
Lost before I picked it up again to re-examine in the present, I certainly remembered 
Burnham’s negative evaluation of the twentieth-century scientific community and of the 
scientific media, but could not recall what he suggested as a remedy. I was brought up short 
when I realized that I had not forgotten what solution he proposed in response to his 
diagnosis, as it was the case that no discussion of solutions had been offered: Burnham’s 
overwrought narrative ends trapped in the present. I was left with a question that is one that 
I have struggled with over the course of my professional life: when we write the history of 
science, who are we writing for, who should we be writing for, and toward what ends?10  
 
Burnham’s only objective may have been to document his judgment that the “triumph of 
superstition . . . [was] signalled by the retreat of broad, well-educated missionaries of science 




form that he pushes to the limit offers little room to entertain other perspectives. And yet, 
who speaks for nature, how scientific knowledge is legitimated, how scientists and publics 
engage: these remain in need of critical consideration today, but not with the shortcomings 
that foreclosing discussion in search of the last word entails.12 Nevertheless, however we 
assess the arguments and moral certitude advanced in How Superstition Won and Science Lost, 
Burnham was right to undertake a critique of scientific authority and democratic realities in 
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